Sunday, November 25, 2012

Yes, Silviculture is Agriculture: Forest Roads Case to be Argued Next Week Before U.S. Supreme Court

If it were up to your environmental organizations, your local tree farmer couldn't call himself a farmer. And he doesn't have a tree farm. No, he is an industrial titan - just as much an industrial operation as mining, oil exploration, and heavy equipment manufacturing.

What? Even though silviculture is simply the agriculture of trees? Even though silviculture is always regulated as agriculture? And EPA says forestry is agriculture? Incredibly, that is just the argument being made by NEDC in the forest roads litigation to be heard before the U.S. Supreme Court next week (consolidated: Decker v. NEDC, No. 11-338, and Georgia-Pacific West, Inc. v. NEDC, No. 11-347). Absurd arguments like this show the disconnect these days between environmental advocacy and reality.

The closing reply briefs of the forest and silviculture interests were filed recently, just ahead of the oral arguments. Georgia-Pacific's brief makes some strong technical arguments about the Clean Water Act, but its strength is in explaining the practicalities of forestry. For example, as lampooned above, the NEDC argued that the timber harvesting is industrial activity, twisting those words almost to their breaking point. Georgia-Pacific, however, points out that silviculture is no more industry than agriculture is: "The use of a chain saw, feller buncher, or cable-yarder to harvest trees no more makes logging 'industrial' than using a 20-ton combine to pick and segregate corn makes crop harvesting 'industrial.'" Consequently, "EPA has determined that forestry roads and silvicultural harvesting ... more closely resemble agricultural land uses than industrial uses."

Georgia Pacific's brief makes four main legal arguments:
  • Channeled forest road runoff is not a discharge "associated with industrial activity."
  • Channeled forest road runoff is not a "point source" discharge.
  • The respondent environmental organization's interpretations would undermine the purpose of the CWA.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to invalidate EPA regulations in this kind of enforcement action.
The brief by the State of Oregon  focuses on the Ninth Circuit's refusal to defer to the expertise of the EPA. Normally, courts are supposed to give the opinions and rules of expert agencies great weight, but in the case below, the Ninth Circuit did not do that: 
Here, EPA has consistently interpreted its stormwater discharge rule to exclude stormwater runoff from forest roads from the permitting requirements and its interpretation is consistent with the text of the rule and EPA's expressed intention when it adopted the rule. In light of its unfaltering interpretation of its rule, EPA's interpretation binds this Court. 
But respondent now suggests that this Court should simply pretend as if the very regulation that respondent is seeking to enforce does not exist at all because the relevant statutory language is "plainly dispositive." (Resp. Br. 17). Yet in so arguing, respondent fails to grapple with the two roadblocks in its path: (1) this Court's longstanding recognition that when Congress entrusts an agency with the responsibility to carry out Congress' directives and that agency carries out its responsibility by adopting a rule, the agency's regulations executing those directions cannot simply be ignored; and (2) the limitations on the scope of review in a citizen suit, which preclude a reviewing court from rejecting an agency's regulations because, in the court's view, the agency's interpretation is inconsistent with the relevant statute.
Stay tuned. The Supreme Court will hear this case next week. I'll post commentary once the transcripts are released. In the meantime, catch up on the history of this dispute in my archives.











Saturday, November 24, 2012

U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Third Property Rights Case This Term, Consider New Deal Agriculture Statute

The U.S. Supreme Court announced earlier this week that it would hear its third property rights case this term. The case is Horne v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 12-236 (cert. granted Nov. 20, 2012). In the case below, the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a takings claim:
Under a federal marketing program for California raisins, the government seeks to stabilize prices by taking some of the annual crop off the market. A federal committee each year recommends to the Agriculture Department the part of the crop that it believes should be held off the market. A packer or processor may buy raisins from the growers for the part of an annual yield that can be marketed, but the part ordered to be withheld must be kept in reserve. These so-called “reserve tonnage” amounts, though, can be sold in markets where competition does not exist, such as school-lunch programs. The proceeds from selling those raisins are used to pay the costs of running that part of the program. 
A group of grape vineyard operators in California were accused by the Department of setting up a program to evade the reserve pool requirement by processing their own grapes into raisins, then selling them. They countered that they were only producers, not processors, and so were not covered by the marketing order and its reserve set-aside. The Department sought to compel them to obey the marketing order, and the vineyards ultimately were ordered to pay $483,844 in civil penalties. 
The vineyards went to court, contending that the reserve set-aside requirement amounted to a “taking” of their private property without just compensation, as required by the Fifth Amendment. A federal district court judge ruled for the Department, finding that the vineyard operators were, in fact, functioning as processors or packers. Transfer of title to the reserve raisins was not a “taking,” the judge concluded. 
The Ninth Circuit Court ultimately ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the “takings” claim, and that the vineyards should take that plea to the Court of Federal Claims under the so-called ”Tucker Act,” which allows lawsuits against the government seeking monetary compensation for taking private property for public use. The vineyards then took the issue of where they may sue to the Supreme Court, resulting in Tuesday’s grant of review.
My fellow bloggers are already noting that this situation sounds a lot like an exaction. This case has an interesting parallel with Koontz v. St Johns River Water Management District, No. 11-1447 (cert. granted Oct. 5, 2012). In both cases, the courts below held that the property owner needed to give in to the government's demand for their property before challenging the demand. With any luck, the Court will make clear two cases arising out of very different contexts that unlawful government demands for property may be challenged in court without giving in first. In that sense, the Court's ruling in either of these cases could end up seeming a bit like Sackett v. EPA, where the Court gave landowners the right to take EPA to court to challenge environmental compliance orders.

You can follow the case's progress over at SCOTUSblog. More background is available from the LA Times. The briefs from the petition for certiorari stage are below.








Sunday, November 11, 2012

Boundary and Fencing Disputes, Adverse Possession, and Property Law in Florida

This weekend I ran across a good resource for Florida property owners. The University of Florida IFAS Extension produced the Handbook of Florida Fence and Property Law a couple of years ago. I thought I would point it out to my readers because it covers a range of interesting topics that I get asked about a lot. It covers a bit about adverse possession, which my most popular blog post covers. It also covers another topic that I am asked about a great deal: neighbor boundary disputes. What happens when neighbors have disputes over their boundary lines or their fences? The handbook summarizes, after giving a great deal of detail:
If your title clearly describes your land and, according to your deed and your neighbor’s deed, your neighbor’s fence is clearly encroaching upon your land, you should immediately notify your neighbor in writing of the encroachment. Your neighbor is required to remove this encroachment. 
If the location of the true boundary line is unclear from both your deed and your neighbor’s deed, avoid future dispute by notifying your neighbor of the ambiguity, calling a surveyor, and clarifying your boundary lines. In the case where you think boundary by agreement or boundary by acquiescence may apply to the dispute, think of the aspects of each and whether they actually apply to your case. 
Remember the three aspects of boundary by agreement: 
1. Uncertainty or doubt as to the true boundary line
2. Agreement that a certain line will be treated by the parties as the true boundary line
3. Subsequent occupation by the parties in accordance with the agreement for a period of time sufficient to show settled recognition of the line as a permanent boundary 
Consider also the two aspects of boundary by acquiescence: 
1. A dispute or uncertainty from which it can be implied that both parties are in doubt as to the true boundary line
2. Continued occupation and acquiescence in a line other than the true boundary for a period of more than seven years (as required by the statute of limitations)
Of course, IFAS has many other guides and handbooks that landowners may find useful.

Thursday, November 1, 2012

A Prime Example of Why the U.S. Supreme Court Needs to Throw Out Florida's Misguided Exactions Ruling

You might ask why the U.S. Supreme Court should overturn Koontz v. St Johns River Water Management District, No. 11-1447 (cert. granted Oct. 5, 2012). Look no further than amicus briefs in Florida courts citing to that case's misguided public policy reasoning. Koontz is the exactions case recently accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court that will decide (1) whether  the Nollan-Dolan exactions test applies to exactions other than real property, such as where a permit applicant is required to pay for work; and (2) whether the Nollan-Dolan exactions test applies where a permit is denied because an applicant rejects an exaction.

In Pacetta, LLC v. Ponce Inlet, Case. No. 2010-31696-CICI (Fla. 7th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012), the question was not about an exaction, but about inverse condemnation and a Bert Harris Act claim. The trial court described a shocking Florida takings tale of government abuse and political corruption. The Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association (FAPA) and the Florida League of Cities have filed an amicus brief in the case on appeal. The amici make a number of arguments that should concern property owners. For example, the amici argue that the public's statutory right to participate in the planning process is disenfranchised by the trial court's protection of the landowners' constitutional property rights. Then, the amici ask the court to assume that landowers will be better off if they have to continuously negotiate their projects, using Koontz:
Finally, the lower court's decision that the discussions between Pacetta and the Town's officials created an equitable estoppel has a pernicious and counterproductive result for the relations between local governments and developers. A prudent developer will consult with the local government when preparing a land development proposal, especially if the existing comprehensive plan and land development regulations do not allow the development as a matter of right. A local government, especially its planning and management staff, ordinarily will expect to advise an potential applicant of the regulatory constraints and will advise the potential applicant about perceived improvements to the potential development. The negotiations continue even after an application is filed, especially if the required Town action on the application is a legislative decision, as here, and not a quasi-judicial decision. Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337, 1340 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (lobbyist's ex-parte communications in a quasi-judicial variance proceeding can violate due process). The discussions and negotiations can result in a better result for both the developer and the local government. As recognized in St. Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011), penalizing the local government for such discussions with the threat of financial consequences if the negotiations fail by the time of the final decision injures both sides:
"... agencies will opt to simply deny permits outright without discussion or negotiation rather than risk the crushing costs of litigation. Property owners will have no opportunity to amend their applications or discuss mitigation options because the regulatory entity will be unwilling to subject itself to potential liability. Land development in certain areas of Florida would come to a standstill. We decline to approve a rule of law that would place Florida land-use regulation in such an unduly restrictive position."
The course of the proceedings between the Pacetta entities, the Town staff and individual officials were not actions that Pacetta can reasonably claim to rely upon for purposes of equitable estoppel. Rather, they were the preliminary, non-binding discussions between the parties that were not legislative, final action. 
The amici might be right about the equitable estoppel issue. I've not reviewed the case record. But it seems especially misguided to say that somehow the landowners should have continued working with a local government that was doing everything in its power to thwart the landowners' efforts. In Koontz, the Florida Supreme Court gave no logical or case law justifications for how property owners would be worse off if governments were allowed to extort property, money, and labor from landowners. The Florida Supreme Court even said that the landowners were better off allowing the practice--though ignoring the fact that the case before it was not about the negotiation process, it was about the permit's denial following negotiations. If there were ever a reason for the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn Koontz, the amici's use of that case to support the government in Ponce Inlet is a great one.

In full disclosure, I'm a member of FAPA and actively involved in it. I spoke at its annual conference this summer on agricultural law and policy in Florida. When I was in my graduate planning program, it honored me as "Student Planner of the Year." Nevertheless, briefs advocating in support of such egregious governmental action, and showing such disregard for individual property rights, make me wonder whether I should continue to support the organization.

Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Environmental Organization Files Brief in Forest Roads Litigation before U.S. Supreme Court

The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC), a non-profit environmental organization, has filed its brief in the forest roads case before the U.S. Supreme Court (consolidated: Decker v. NEDC, No. 11-338, and Georgia-Pacific West, Inc. v. NEDC, No. 11-347). Before I jump into the summary, here's a quick reminder of where we're at. It all started when the Ninth Circuit struck down EPA's longstanding Silvicultural Rule under the Clean Water Act, which meant that many forest landowners would need federal stormwater permits for their forest and logging roads. In response, last December, Congress stayed NPDES permitting through October 1, 2012. EPA worked much of this year to develop revisions to its Clean Water Act rules for logging roads (but it is still working on what to do with the broader category of forest roads).


NEDC argues that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was correct because:
  1. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the NEDC's citizen suit seeks to enforce EPA's regulations, rather than challenge them. 
  2. This case only involves the active channelization of water into ditches and conveyances that go along with logging roads and are discharges that must be permitted. It doesn't involve non-point sources or natural runoff.
  3. The accumulation of sediment into the water is an "acute environmental problem" that the EPA must address.
We'll see the landowners' responses to these points soon enough, but here is some food for thought. NEDC's first point seems to be one of those games we lawyers play with words and semantics. Even though NEDC was seeking to enforce EPA's regulations, it still challenged EPA's interpretation of them. The second point is well taken. But it does not squarely address the landowners' argument, which is not whether there is a discharge, but rather whether that discharge is associated with industrial activity, as required by law.. The third point is not especially compelling, since it basically argues that the Court should ignore out the landowners' policy reasoning but accept its own.

EDIT: 10/31/12 - Originally, I mistakenly used the acronym "NRDC," rather than NEDC. This may have called to mind for my readers familiar with environmental organizations the Natural Resource Defense Counsel. That organization is not a party to the case. Thanks to my readers for pointing out the mistake, which has now been corrected.



Sunday, October 21, 2012

Third Quarter 2012: Recent Florida Environmental and Land Use Case Law

The Florida Bar's Environmental and Land Use Law Section has posted its column on the environmental and land use cases in Florida that you need to know about for the third quarter of 2012. It's a relatively small bunch this time:
  • Southern Union Co. v. United States, - S. Ct. -, 2012 WL 2344465 (2012), determined that the Sixth Amendment protection requiring that juries determine any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases a criminal defendant’s maximum potential sentence applies to the sentencing of criminal environmental fines. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the $18 million penalty assessed against Southern Union and sent the case back to the appeals court for further consideration.
  • FT Investments, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, - So.3d -, 2012 WL 2138110 (Fla. 1st DCa 2012), holding that a third party defense to strict liability for petroleum contamination only applies if the purchaser of the contaminated property had no knowledge of the contamination after a reasonable inquiry. The takeaway here is that liability under the statute is strict - do not assume that just because you did not cause the contamination you cannot be held liable for it.
  • Department of Transportation v. Florida Gas Transmission Co., - So.3d -, 2012 WL 2014755 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), discussing issues related to contractual interpretation of a gas pipeline easement.
  • Turkali v. Safety Harbor, Case no. 2D11-3649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), explaining, as I have discussed previously, that a "valid, bona fide appraisal" under the Bert J. Harris Private Property Protection Act must provide information about the value of the individual property at issue. As I discussed before, it's important to make sure that you follow the statute precisely to preserve your statutory rights.
As always, if you're interested in previous case law updates, take a look at my past posts for previous cases I've summarized about Florida environmental and land use law.

Friday, October 5, 2012

U.S. Supreme Court to Determine What Governments Can Request in Exchange for Permits

In a case with big implications for landowners and governments of all levels and sizes, the U.S. Supreme Court has just agreed to hear Koontz v. St Johns River Water Management District, No. 11-1447 (cert. granted Oct. 5, 2012). As readers of my blog know, this is an important property rights case dealing with exactions.

In St. Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), the Florida Supreme Court declined to recognize an exaction under U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Koontz had been trying to develop his property since 1994, when he had applied to the District for a permit. The District agreed to grant the permit on two conditions. First, the District required that Koontz deed part of his property into a conservation area, which he agreed to do. Second, the District required that Koontz perform offsite mitigation several miles by replacing culverts and plugging drainage canals on District-owned properties seven miles from his property, which Koontz refused. When the District then denied the permit, Koontz sued in state court, arguing that the District’s offsite mitigation condition was an unconstitutional exaction because it violated the Nollan-Dolan test. The trial court found that the District had taken Koontz’s property through an unconstitutional exaction because the condition was not related to the impacts of his project. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.

The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding there was no taking. The court explained that the Nollan-Dolan test only applied to exactions of real property, where a permit was actually issued imposing the onerous exaction. The court acknowledged a line of cases applying the Nollan-Dolan test beyond real property exactions, but it held that these cases went beyond the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings. The court also explained that, as a matter of public policy, land use regulation would become prohibitively expensive if agencies were subject to inverse condemnation claims anytime they denied a permit. Consequently, the court held there was no taking because no permit was ever issued.

Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Koontz has asked the Court to establish that:
  1. The Nollan-Dolan exactions test applies to exactions other than real property, such as where a permit applicant is required to pay for work; and 
  2. The Nollan-Dolan exactions test applies where a permit is denied because an applicant rejects an exaction.
This is excellent news for landowners. The Pacific Legal Organization, which is representing the landowner in this case, has an excellent track record before the Supreme Court: it has won six out of the seven cases it has argued there. It won the seminal case in this area of the law before the Supreme Court, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). And in March of this year, it won Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. __ (2012), which gave property owners the right to take EPA to court over a compliance order dealing with wetlands.

This case just may go down in history as the only time my hometown Palatka, Florida is relevant before the Supreme Court. The District is housed there. For those interested in researching further, the Supreme Court's docket for the case is here. I'll have an article in the American Planning Association's Planning & Law Newsletter soon with more analysis.

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

What If the Government's Power Plant Kills Your Chickens? More on Elevating Public Interest above Private Property Rights

The transcript for today's flood takings case argued before the U.S. Supreme Court is out. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, No. 11-597 (cert. granted Apr. 2, 2012). As Lawrence Hurley points in out in his recap of today's oral argument, a majority of the Court seemed sympathetic to the property owner's plight. As always, the justices tossed out some fun, nearly nonsensical hypotheticals that make lawyers recall their worst days in law school.

Earlier this week, I explained that, behind the legal doctrines, is a simple philosophical question: should property rights depend on the importance of the public interest? Today, the federal government said that's exactly the case (represented below by Mr. Kneedler). In fact, Congress had been good enough to help these landowners to begin with, so that the landowners should have known that the government could later decide to flood their lands:
MR. KNEEDLER: I don't believe that that's correct. I mean, that -- that would turn on the happenstance of what a particular landowner had -- had on his property downstream. And I think the government, in operating the general project, cannot be held to do an investigation of every property owner. Again, it's releasing water generally. And if we -- maybe if I could use the levy example here. This -- the release changes that were made here were made to protect farmers so that they could -­ so that they could plant more crops and not -- and be protected during their harvesting.  If you shift back to what the Corps -- to the Corps' regular operating scheme, it affects the farmers. There might be a flood -­ 
MR. KNEEDLER: It is in the nature -­ 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That doesn't seem to me particularly fair. 
MR. KNEEDLER: It is in the nature of living along a river. Riparian ownership carries with it certain risks and uncertainties, from weather, from intervening causes. The government is -- there are a thousand square miles, more square miles of drainage area -- 
JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think -- one of those risks has to be the Government's going to make you pay for protecting somebody else.  Is that one of the risks? 
MR. KNEEDLER: Well, when -- picking up on what I said about Congress, Congress would not have
gotten into the flood control business without this protection of liability. People -­
JUSTICE SCALIA: I doubt that.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, the issue is who is going to pay for the wonderful benefit to these farmers. Should it be everybody, so that the government pays, and all of us pay through taxes, or should it be this -­ this particular sorry landowner who happens to lose all his trees?
Even Justice Breyer agreed that this position was absurd, since the government undertakes public works in many fields, and in all of them it must compensate a property owners if something goes awry and property is taken:
JUSTICE BREYER: But building a Government project, let's say an electricity plant or high tension wires, you could require the taking of some land to build it. Now, you've got that and you begin to run it. You could run it in such a way that it takes some of the property. I mean, the electricity could, for example, because of some odd thing run around over somebody's land and kill all the chickens. That wasn't expected but it happens, and it happened because of the way the Government runs the plant. Now, I guess there would be a taking in such circumstance if in fact, because of the way it's run, it makes that land which no one thought would happen, as a consequence of the project uninhabitable; wouldn't there be? 
MR. KNEEDLER: Well, again, it depends. If the Government -- if the Government is occupying the land when it happens, yes. But there's -- as you've I think pointed out, there's a critical difference between a tort and a taking. And there -- there can be collateral consequences of what the Government does that -- that cause injury. 
JUSTICE BREYER: The collateral consequence is to make some piece of land 4 miles away quite unexpectedly but totally uninhabitable. Now, what's supposed to happen there? That's not just a trespass because it's permanent. And even if it's once every 2 years, it's permanently once every 2 years.
Hopefully the rest of the Court will agree that it is absurd to elevate the public interest so much that a private landowner must single-handedly bear a burden that results from a benefit given to the public at large. Otherwise, expect to see less private investment in areas near government public works.

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Can a Legislature Pass Laws Limiting the Right to Compensation for a Taking?

Over the past week, I've been writing about a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that asks whether a property owner can be compensated for its timber, where the government destroyed the trees. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, No. 11-597 (cert. granted Apr. 2, 2012). In Florida, we have a long line of cases dealing with the destruction of trees because the state has the power by statute to destroy citrus trees where they pose a danger to other trees, such as by citrus canker infection. A recent case highlighted the problem of compensation for the trees and answered an interesting property rights question.

What if a legislature decided that private property takings claims were becoming too burdensome? Could the legislature pass a law limiting the right to compensation for inverse condemnation? The 3d DCA recently addressed this question head-on. Florida Dept. of Agric. & Consumer Services v. Brignoni, - So. 3d -, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). According to the 3d DCA, the answer is no:
The provision of the Florida Constitution providing that “[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation,” Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const., is self-executing; therefore, “it is immaterial that there is no statute specifically authorizing recovery for loss.” Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid–Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d 101, 103 n. 2 (Fla.1988). “[T]he point is that the common law and statutory provisions for inverse condemnation do not displace the constitutional requirement for just compensation....” Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So.3d 84, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 48 So.3d 835 (Fla.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2874, 179 L.Ed.2d 1188 (2011). 
The relevant compensation portion of Florida's Citrus Canker Law, § 581.1845(4), Fla. Stat. (2006), provides: The specification of a per-tree amount paid for the residential citrus canker compensation program does not limit the amount of any other compensation that may be paid by another entity or pursuant to court order for the removal of citrus trees as part of a citrus canker eradication program. 
As the Florida Supreme Court has stated: [The] Citrus Canker Law sets a compensation floor that is consistent with the established principle that “the determination of what is just compensation ... is a judicial function that cannot be performed by the Legislature.” Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So.2d 774, 785 (Fla.2004) (quoting State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So.2d 401, 407 (Fla.1959)); see also Patchen, 906 So.2d at 1008 (“[W]e conclude that the schedule established by the Legislature sets a floor but does not determine the amount of compensation. When the State destroys private property, the State is obligated to pay just and fair compensation as determined in a court of law.” (quoting Haire, 870 So.2d at 785)). 
In sum, it is not only beyond legislative purview to displace the constitutional requirement of just compensation upon a taking, but section 581.1845 expressly contemplates the entry of a court order obligating the State to compensate a homeowner for the destruction of his or her residential citrus trees under the CCEP in excess of the statutory per-tree amount. The Florida Supreme Court, finding the statute remedial, gave section 581.1845 its plain meaning, “which is to provide compensation to homeowners who had trees destroyed on or after January 1, 1995.” Patchen, 906 So.2d at 1008. Although the concurring and dissenting opinions in Patchen suggest concern over whether the majority opinion impliedly eliminated the right to pursue an inverse condemnation claim for the destruction of residential citrus trees, the majority opinion limits the scope of its opinion to the certified question posed.3 See Patchen, 906 So.2d at 1005–09. Accordingly, “[i]f the compensation required by the Constitution exceeds a statutory amount, the State will have to pay that amount.” Bogorff, 35 So.3d at 91.
That is, in Florida, the Legislature is welcome to set a minimum for compensation to injured property owners.  It could not, however, arbitrarily cap the amount of compensation that a property owner could receive, or keep the property owners out of court in an effort to recover just compensation. Put simply, the Legislature must respect the rights protected in the federal and state constitutions.


Sunday, September 30, 2012

Property Rights at Stake This Week: Should Property Rights Depend on the Importance of the Public Interest?

Last week, I previewed the property rights case to be argued this week before the U.S. Supreme Court. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, No. 11-597 (cert. granted Apr. 2, 2012). I focused on the legal arguments in the case, which seeks payment for the extensive timber that was destroyed when the Army Corps of Engineers flooded the Commission's property. Lawrence Hurley has written a great article giving a feel for just how important this case is at the local level. The article also explains the property rights at stake and the implications of the case:
The case could have implications beyond the narrow question of Army Corps-directed water discharges. Those keen for the Supreme Court to become more active in the property rights area, like Jonathan Adler, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, certainly hope so. "We don't see many property rights cases," he said. "The language of the opinion will really matter." 
Others are wary of the Supreme Court expanding the definition of what constitutes a taking. John Echeverria, a professor at Vermont Law School, is concerned that any kind of ruling in favor of Arkansas could have "enormous implications" for local governments. 
Although the federal government is the defendant in the case before the court, local governments are far more likely to be on the receiving end of such claims if the Supreme Court endorses the practice, Echeverria wrote in a brief in support of the Army Corps filed by the International Municipal Lawyers Association and other local government groups. 
In an interview, Echeverria said property rights advocates would be keen for a broad ruling on "temporary takings" that could prompt challenges to such activities as government inspections of property. "This is one front of a multifaceted debate over property rights," he added. "The property rights advocates see it as an opportunity to expand the doctrine."
Professor Echeverria is well known for having never seen a property rights claim that amounted to a taking. He supported the State of Florida before the U.S. Supreme Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). In that case, I worked for counsel of record in representing the property owners after the Florida Supreme Court rewrote its waterfront property law. 

In this case, Professor Echeverria "urge[s] the Court to avoid an interpretation of the Takings Clause that would impose unreasonable new burdens on local governments charged with addressing flooding threats and other serious water management challenges":
The facts of this relatively unique case have the potential to obscure the particular threats to local governments posed by the arguments of Petitioner and its  amici curiae for extending physical takings octrine to temporary occupations or invasions. In a variety of contexts, for a variety of important public purposes, government officials intentionally or inadvertently cause temporary or occasional physical invasions of private property. Exposing local taxpayers to potential financial liability under the Takings Clause for all such incidental injuries to property would impose significant  new financial burdens on already straitened local governments as well as impede important government functions. In other words, in the context of  temporary invasions or occupations, as much as with regulatory restrictions, “government hardly could go on” if it could be held liable under the Takings Clause every time it acted. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
Of most immediate concern, Petitioner’s proposed takings theory would seriously undermine the ability of local governments to address a host of local water management issues. Managing the flow of storm water, sewage and other forms of water is one of the most important and difficult functions of local government.
Professor Echeverria seems to miss the point of constitutional protection of property rights entirely. As is always the case in property rights disputes, there are many competing interests at stake here. The interests of farmers and others that the Army Corps was working towards when it flooded the Commission's property are certainly important, as were the more general interests of the public in being protected from flooding. That makes this case all the more compelling: property rights must be respected, no matter how compelling the public interest is. Any other rule cheapens the freedoms we've worked so diligently for in this country.